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Conceptualising	the	Right	to	Data	
Protection	in	an	Era	of	Big	Data	
In	2009,	with	 the	 enactment	of	 the	Lisbon	Treaty,	 the	Charter	of	 Fundamental	
Rights	of	the	European	Union	entered	into	force.	Under	Article	8	of	the	Charter,	
for	 the	 first	 time,	 a	 stand-alone	 fundamental	 right	 to	 data	 protection	 was	
declared.	 The	 creation	 of	 this	 right,	 standing	 as	 a	 distinct	 right	 to	 the	 right	 to	
privacy,	is	undoubtedly	significant,	and	it	is	unique	to	the	European	legal	order,	
being	 absent	 from	 other	 international	 human	 rights	 instruments,	 such	 as	 the	
International	 Covenant	 on	 Civil	 and	 Political	 Rights.	 However,	 the	 European	





of	 the	 challenges	 in	 implementing	 this	 right	 in	 an	 era	 of	 ubiquitous	
‘dataveillance’,	 or	 the	 systematic	 monitoring	 of	 citizen’s	 communications	 or	
actions	through	the	use	of	information	technology	(Clarke,	1988),	and	‘big	data’,	







Directive	 and	 related	 rules	 ‘could	 best	 be	 regarded	 as	 principles	 of	 good	
governance’,	as	they	were	not	framed	as	relating	to	the	human	rights	of	the	data	




terms	of	rights,	with	Article	1	noting	that	 the	Regulation	 ‘protects	 fundamental	




alone	 right	 to	 data	 protection,	 especially	 given	 that	 the	 European	 Court	 of	




protection	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 right	 to	 privacy,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 rights	 to	
freedom	of	thought,	conscience	and	religion;	freedom	of	expression;	an	effective	
remedy,	and	a	fair	trial,	it	has	some	distinct	elements	that	justify	its	framing	as	a	
stand-alone	right.	These	elements	are:	 that	data	should	be	processed	 fairly,	 for	
specific	purposes,	and	only	on	the	basis	of	the	consent	of	the	person	concerned	
or	 some	 other	 legitimate	 basis	 set	 down	 in	 law;	 the	 right	 of	 access	 and	
rectification	of	data	collected,	and	control	by	an	independent	authority	(Article	8,	
Charter	of	Fundamental	Rights).	
This	 new	 construction	 effectively	 elevates	 established	 principles	 of	 data	
protection	 to	obligations	 incumbent	on	data	processers	 in	order	 to	 respect	 the	
rights	of	data	subjects.	In	a	Habermassian	sense,	this	adds	some	normative	force	
to	the	rights	holder’s	claim,	insofar	as	individuals’	status	is	enhanced	when	they	
demand	 compliance	 with	 rights,	 as	 opposed	 to	 some	 moral	 obligation	
(Habermas,	2010:	349).	Indeed,	the	framing	of	data	protection	as	a	right	appears	
to	 have	 imposed	 much	 greater	 obligations	 on	 private	 actors	 than	 most	 other	




and	 practically	 significant.	 The	 reasons	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 this	 right	 are	
somewhat	 unclear,	 however,	 and	 the	 explanations	 relating	 to	 the	 Charter	
provide	little	illustration	in	this	regard.	It	could	be	said	to	have	been	a	reflection	
of	 an	 increasing	 recognition	 of	 the	 right	 in	 domestic	 law	 across	 Europe	 –	 the	





different	 terms,	 being	 linked	 to	 distinct	 constitutional	 concepts	 in	 those	 states	
that	had	developed	the	right.		
Another	theory	suggests	that	the	purpose	behind	the	development	of	the	right	to	
data	 protection	 in	 the	 Charter	 was	 to	 apply	 the	 principles	 of	 good	 data	
processing	 to	 those	 European	 Union	 activities	 that	 fell	 outside	 the	 Data	
Protection	Directive’s	remit,	namely	police	and	security	co-operation	(Cannataci	
and	 Mifsud-Bonnici,	 2005;	 Article	 29	 Working	 Party,	 2009).	 That	 argument,	
while	 attractive,	 is	 not	 supported	 by	 the	 GDPR,	 which	 expressly	 excludes	
national	security	activities	and	the	processing	of	personal	data	in	relation	to	the	
Union’s	common	foreign	and	security	policy	 from	the	scope	of	 the	Regulation’s	









per	 se;	 it	 prescribes	 the	 procedures	 and	 methods	 for	 pursuing	 the	 respect	 of	
values	embodied	in	other	rights’	(de	Andrade,	2012).	Determann,	for	example,	is	
critical	of	 the	Schrems	judgment	 in	pointing	out	 that	 the	claimant	 ‘could	hardly	
show	 any	 plausible	 harm	 or	 need	 of	 protection’	 (Determann,	 2016:	 246).	 This	





failure	 to	 respect	 a	 component	 of	 the	 right	 to	 a	 fair	 trial	 (such	 as	 the	 right	 to	
examine	witnesses,	or	access	to	a	lawyer)	has	had	no	discernible	impact	on	the	
outcome	of	the	trial	(Trechsel,	2005).	Rights	are	recognised	as	such	because	they	












those	 intimate	 matters	 to	 which	 a	 ‘reasonable	 expectation	 of	 privacy’	 might	
attach	 (Campbell,	 2004),	 to	 a	 wider	 notion	 of	 ‘the	 right	 to	 be	 left	 alone’	 (Von	
Hannover,	2004),	to	an	even	broader,	more	recent,	idea	that	the	right	to	privacy	
is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	 protection	 of	 one’s	 identity	 (Hildebrandt,	 2006).	 Data	
protection	clearly	fits	closest	within	this	third	sphere	–	while	some	data	(such	as	
medical	 information)	might	be	of	 the	sort	 to	which	a	reasonable	expectation	of	
privacy	 attaches,	 other	 data	 (e.g.	 identifying	 data	 such	 as	 one’s	 address	 and	
phone	number)	falls	outside	of	that	scope.	Equally,	the	idea	of	the	right	to	be	left	
alone	 presupposes	 some	 intrusion	 into	 one’s	 day-to-day	 life,	 yet	 the	 Snowden	
leaks	 showed	 that	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 surveillance	 happens	 in	 the	 background,	




Another	 important	 value	 that	 the	 right	 to	 data	 protection	 protects	 is	 the	




of	 dignity.	 When	 German	 courts	 developed	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘informational	 self-
determination’,	 it	was	conceived	as	related	to	the	constitutional	right	to	dignity	
(1	 BvR	 209,	 1983).	 The	 focus	 on	 consent	 in	 the	 right	 to	 data	 protection	 fits	
closest	with	the	so-called	‘will	theory’	of	rights.	The	will	theory	sees	the	function	
of	rights	as	being	the	granting	of	control	to	rights	holders	to	subject	others	to	a	





well-documented	 (McStay,	 2013),	 and	 some	 have	 questioned	 whether	 it	 is	
desirable	 to	 leave	 it	 to	 the	 individual	data	 subject	 to	 improve	 the	 level	 of	data	
protection.	 (Matzner	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 As	 the	 European	 Commission’s	 Impact	
Assessment	 noted,	 ‘individuals	 are	 often	 neither	 aware	 nor	 in	 control	 of	what	
happens	 to	 their	 personal	 data	 and	 therefore	 fail	 to	 exercise	 their	 rights	
effectively’	 (European	 Commission,	 2012).	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 GDPR	marries	 the	
emphasis	on	autonomy	and	consent	with	a	parallel	 focus	on	 the	duties	of	data	
controllers,	 regardless	 of	 whether	 data	 subjects	 have	 taken	 positive	 steps	 to	
enforce	 those	 duties.	 (Quelle,	 2011)	 This	 aspect	 fits	 most	 closely	 with	 the	
‘interest	theory’	of	rights,	which	sees	the	function	of	human	rights	as	imposing	a	
positive	duty	on	actors	to	respect	the	interests	of	others,	irrespective	of	whether	
the	 rights-holder	 claims	 that	 duty	 (Raz,	 1984).	 Indeed,	 some	 have	 argued	 that	
the	focus	on	data	controllers	in	the	GDPR	is	inherently	paternalistic,	insofar	as	it	
requires	 an	 assumption	 of	 the	 will	 of	 the	 rights	 holder	 that	 has	 not	 been	
expressly	 articulated	 (Quelle,	 2011).	 However,	 given	 the	 degree	 to	 which	
research	has	shown	people	to	be	oblivious	to	the	terms	and	conditions	that	they	
willingly	 sign	 up	 to,	 it	 would	 seem	 that	 placing	 some	 of	 those	 obligations	 on	





of	 data	 protection	 (Lynskey,	 2014),	 given	 the	 issues	 surrounding	 consent	 and	
knowledge,	 as	 mentioned	 above.	 The	 GDPR	 attempts	 to	 address	 this	 fact,	 by	
defining	 ‘consent’	 as	 ‘any	 freely	 given,	 specific,	 informed	 and	 unambiguous	
indication	of	the	data	subject's	wishes	by	which	he	or	she,	by	a	statement	or	by	a	
clear	 affirmative	 action,	 signifies	 agreement	 to	 the	processing	of	 personal	 data	
relating	to	him	or	her’.	(Article	4(11),	GDPR)	Pursuant	to	Article	7,	any	request	
for	 consent	 should	 be	 intelligible,	 accessible,	 and	 in	 clear	 and	 plain	 language;	
Recital	 58	 of	 the	 GDPR	 explicitly	 links	 this	 requirement	 to	 ‘the	 principle	 of	
transparency’.	 	 This	 formulation	 is	 ‘information-forcing’	 and	 addresses	 the	











status	 or	 sexual	 orientation’	 (Recital	 71,	 GDPR).	 To	 that	 end,	 the	 GDPR	




biometric	 or	 genetic	 data	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 identifying	 an	 individual	 or	
revealing	 any	 their	 protected	 characteristics	 (Article	 22,	 GDPR)	 is	 expressly	
prohibited,	subject	to	a	number	of	exceptions.	
	
These	 prohibitions	 recognize	 that	 such	 processing	 can	 have	 an	 inherently	
discriminatory	effect,	and	discrimination	 is	one	of	 the	potential	harms	 listed	 in	
Recital	 75	 of	 the	 GDPR.	 It	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 the	 right	 to	 data	 protection	
protects	 one’s	 ‘future	 life’,	 insofar	 as	 the	 collection	 of	 data	may	 not	 cause	 any	
harm	 at	 the	 time	 of	 its	 collection,	 but	 the	 potential	 that	 this	 data	 can	 be	
processed	 at	 a	 later	 date	 to	 profile	 or	make	 assessments	 about	 the	 person	 or	
group	of	persons	in	question.	The	knowledge	that	data	can	be	collected	in	bulk	





The	 contemporary	 context	 of	 ubiquitous	 veillance	 practices	 and	 the	 increased	
focus	on	the	collection	and	processing	of	big	data	poses	some	unique	challenges	
to	 the	 right	 to	 data	 protection.	 Before	 turning	 to	 two	 specific	 challenges,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 clarify	 the	 meaning	 of	 both	 ‘veillance’	 and	 ‘big	 data’.	 Mann	 has	
distinguished	between	three	types	of	veillance	–	the	classic	‘surveillance’,	when	a	





the	 information	may	 be	 stored	 virtually	 forever.’	 (Rouvroy	 and	 Poullet,	 2009)	
Bakir	 has	 referred	 to	 the	 new	 phenomenon	 of	 ‘veillant	 panoptic	 assemblage’,	
where	data	gathered	 through	 the	ordinary	citizen’s	veillance	practices	 finds	 its	
way	 to	 state	 surveillance	mechanisms,	 through	 the	 corporations	 that	hold	 that	
data	(Bakir,	2015).	Big	data	is	a	notoriously	difficult	concept	to	find	a	commonly	
accepted	definition	for	(Ward	and	Barker,	2013),	but	a	number	of	key	features	of	
big	data	have	been	 identified,	 including:	 the	huge	volume	of	data,	 the	 speed	at	
which	it	is	collected,	the	variety	of	data,	its	relational	nature	(allowing	linkages	to	







self’,	 or	 the	 self-tracking	 of	 biological,	 environmental,	 physical,	 or	 behavioural	
information	through	tracking	devices,	Internet-of-things	devices,	social	network	






to	 prevent	 future	 crimes,	 such	 as	 terrorist	 attacks	 and	 cyber-attacks,	 and	 the	
‘watchers’	 are	 less	 visible	 than	 in	 the	 past,	 given	 that	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 their	
surveillance	 is	 by	 means	 of	 ‘dataveillance’,	 or	 surveilling	 online	 and	
communications	 data	 rather	 than	 physical	 movements.	 (Richards	 and	 King,	
2013;	 Graham	 and	Marvin,	 2001)	 According	 to	Waldron,	 any	 ‘theory	 of	 rights	
will	 face	 difficulties	 about	 the	 interests	 it	 identifies	 as	 rights,	 and	 the	 terms	 in	
which	 it	 identifies	 them.	 Those	 disagreements	 will	 in	 turn	 be	 vehicles	 for	
controversies	 about	 the	 proper	 balance	 to	 be	 struck	 between	 some	 individual	
interest	and	some	countervailing	social	considerations’.	(Waldron,	1993:	30)	The	
correct	balance	to	be	struck	between	the	interests	protected	by	the	right	to	data	
protection,	 as	 outlined	 above,	 and	whether	 the	 curtailment	 of	 some	 aspects	 of	
that	 right	 constitutes	 as	 necessary	 and	 proportionate	 measure	 to	 protect	
national	security	will	continue	to	be	a	subject	of	debate	for	many	years	to	come.		
	
In	addition,	 the	right	 to	data	protection	comes	 into	conflict	with	the	 interest	of	
international	 co-operation	 in	 security	matters	 and,	more	 generally,	 companies’	
desire	to	allow	the	free	transfer	of	data	from	its	operations	in	an	EU	state	to	one	
of	 its	 operations	 in	 a	 third	 country.	Much	 focus	 in	 the	 literature	on	 transfer	of	




However,	 the	 European	 Commission	 has	 also	 decided	 that	 data	 can	 be	
transferred	to	states	that	are	not	particularly	renowned	for	their	data	protection	










view,	 there	 is	 reason	 to	 believe	 that	 surveillance	 activities	 will	 be	 even	 more	
enhanced	and	possibly	more	overt	under	the	new	President	than	his	predecessor	
(Glaser,	 2016);	 whether	 Privacy	 Shield	 will	 continue	 to	 satisfy	 citizens,	
companies,	 governments	 and	 intergovernmental	 organizations	 in	 this	 new	
political	climate	remains	far	from	certain.		
	
Lastly,	 a	 word	 of	 caution	 should	 be	 sounded	 on	 the	 increasing	 trend	 towards	
using	algorithms	to	predict	future	crimes.	(de	Goede,	2014)	This	form	of	 ‘social	
sorting’	(Lyon,	2002)	has	the	inherent	danger	of	perpetuating	discrimination	and	
assumptions	 about	 certain	 strands	of	populations.	The	 accuracy	 these	big	data	





rights	 and	 freedoms,	 insofar	 as	 people	 self-regulate,	 being	 aware	 of	 ‘a	 state	 of	







This	 piece	 examined	 the	 principles	 underpinning	 the	 human	 right	 to	 data	
protection	and	argued	that	this	unique	and	newly-created	right	reflects	some	key	
values	 inherent	 in	 the	 European	 legal	 order,	 namely:	 privacy,	 transparency,	
autonomy,	 and	 non-discrimination.	 The	 contemporary	 context	 of	 enhanced	
veillance	 (both	 by	 the	 state	 and	 fellow	 citizens),	 the	 repurposing	 of	 data,	 the	
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